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Penny Matching Machines 
GERALD hi. ~VHITE 
General Eleclric Research Laboratory, Schenectady, New York 
A problem currently facing engineers is the design of machines 
capable of making decisions. This article contains a description of 
the strategies a machine or player might use in a simple penny match- 
ing game. The adversary inthis game is a simple indifferent opponent, 
who has the characteristic that his probability of playing heads is 
independent of the outcome of the game. Throughout the game the 
player attempts to select heads or tails in a manner that maximizes 
his expected net gain. If the player does have this criterion, his de- 
cisions depend upon his estimate of his opponents probability of 
playing heads. Under certain conditions, optimum decisions can be 
performed with a single analogue storage lement. 
If the opponent plays according to conditional probabilities, the 
player should estimate the two quantities Ph(h), the probability a
head follows a head, and Pt(h), the probability a head follows a tail. 
If the player is unaware that his opponent is playing conditional 
probabilities and assumes that the opponent's probabilities are in- 
dependent of previous elections, he may suffer a loss. The amount 
of this loss, if it does occur, is a function of PA(h) and P,(h). 
LIST OF 
GHh ,G11~ , Grh , Gr, Utilities given 
to the player 
P(h) The probability the oppo- 
nent plays a head 
Pn(h) The conditional probability 
the opponent plays a head, if he 
previously played a head 
P,(h) The conditional probability 
the opponent plays a head, if he 
previously played a tail 
r The number of timcs the oppo- 
nent selects heads 
SYMBOLS 
s The number of times the oppo- 
nent selects tails 
u = r+sThe  total number of 
selections 
P[P(h)] A priori probability den- 
sity of the opponent picking a 
P(h) 
P(t) The probability the opponent 
plays a tail 
E[P(h)]The expected value of 
P(h) 
E(NG) Expected net gain 
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P(H)  The probability the player 
selects a head 
K All arbitrary positive constant 
D A quantity in storage 
p(h)  Marginal probability of the 
opponent playing heads 
p(t)  Marginal probability of the 
opponent playing tails 
Eh(NG)  The conditional expected 
net gain if a head were previ- 
ously played by the opponent 
Et (NG)  The conditional expected 
net gain, if a tail were previously 
played by the opponent 
Ph(H)  The conditional probability 
the player plays heads, if the 
opponent previously played 
heads 
Pt (H)  The conditional probability 
the player plays heads, if the 
opponent previously played tails 
Sh, St Two analogue storage ele- 
ments 
a = [a .h  + aT ,  - -  G1,, - a~h] 
9 P (h )  -{- G,t  - Grt 
fl = [Grh -- Gr,]P(h) -'}- GTt 
= Grt -- Gtu 
5" = Gl, h "{- GTt -- GHt -- Grh 
INTRODUCTION 
"How can machines be designed to make decisions?" Before this 
question can be answered, it is necessary to specify many details about 
the machine, e.g., the environment of the machine, the criterion the 
machine adopts, etc. This article discusses the optimum strategy a 
machine should follow in playing a very simple penny matching ame. 
At every move the machine must make a decision to select either a head 
or a tail. This decision depends on the machine's knowledge of the 
opponent's characteristics, the opponent's past selections, and the ele- 
ments of utility that accrue to the machine as a result of each selection. 
Furthermore, it is desirable that the machine require a minimum amount 
of analogue storage in following this optimum strategy. 
The strategy, the game, and the opponent described are on a very un- 
sophisticated level. However, a detailed iscussion of these systems con- 
stitutes a first step toward designing machines capable of making de- 
cisions for very complicated situations. 
THE GAME 
The rules of the game are very simple. The opponent selects either a 
head or a tail. At the same time, the player makes a similar choice. 
Neither opponent nor player knows what his adversary has chosen until 
both have made their selection. The reward that is given to the player 
is then determined by the game matrix, a form of which is given in Fig. 1. 
GBh represents the utility given to the player, if both he and the 
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Player 
Opponent 
Head h Tail t 
IIead H GHh G11t 
Tail T GTh Gr, 
FzG. 1. Game matrix 
opponent select heads. Gr^ represents he utility given to the player if 
he selects tails and the opponent selects heads. Similar statements apply 
for the other terms G11t and GT,. 
In this paper we denote that a player selected a head or a tail by the 
use of capital etters, H and T. Similarly, the opponent's choice is indi- 
cated by the small etters, h and I. A simple matrix which we call a unity 
game matrix occurs when 
GHh = Grt = 1 and G, t= Grh = --1 (1) 
This is the usual matrix employed in the common penny matching ame 
where the player elccts to match his opponent. We shall assume that the 
player is always aware of the elements of the game matrix. Furthermore, 
to simplify the discussion, we assume that the expression 
GHh -~ Grt -- Gut - Grh > 0 (2) 
OPPONENT 
Two distinct classes of opponents can be describcd: indifferent op- 
ponents and intcrested opponents. An opponent who is a member of the 
indifferent class selects his heads and tails by a method (probabilistie or 
detcrministic) that is independent of the selections made by the player, 
and the positive or negative utilities that may accrue to him as a result 
of the player's or his selections. This indicates that there is no feedback 
to him from the outcome of the game (Fig. 2). A member of the in- 
terested class may base his choice, which may be a probabilistie or deter- 
ministic one, on the previous elections of the player or on the utilities 
he receives. This implies feedback to him from the outcome of the game 
(Fig. 3). While many interesting problems arise in analyzing the strate- 
gies of a player confronted by an interested opponent, this paper is 
concerned only with stratcgies that a player should adopt against an 
indifferent opponent. 
The type of opponent and player postulatcd in this article differ 
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radically from the minimax player and opponent described in many 
of the zero-sum, two person game theory problems. In these games, both 
participants tend to adopt the minimax strategy. Both know that their 
opponent will take maximum advantage, if either of them deviates from 
this ultraconservative manner of playing. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that many times the strategies prescribed for the player postulated in 
this article differ from the minimax strategy. 
For our analysis we must furnish still further details as to how the 
indifferent opponent may play. Two types of indifferent opponents are 
listed below and a section of the paper is devoted to the optimum strate- 
gies that the player should employ against each of them. 
1. A FIRST ORDER PROBABILISTIC STATIONARY OPPONENT (A BER- 
NOULLI OPPONENT) 
This opponent selects a probability, P(h), of playing heads from a 
distribution of P(h)'s. Once he selects this P(h) he never changes it. 
His selcctiou of heads each time has a probability P(h) that is inde- 
pendent of all his previous elections. 
2. A SECOND ORDER PROBABILISTIC STATIONARY OPPONENT ( i  MAR- 
Kov OPPONENT) 
In this case the opponent selects a Ph (h) from a distribution of Ph(h)'s 
and a P,(h) from a distribution of P,(h)'s. I'h(h) is the probability that 
he plays a head at a given time, if he had previously played a head. 
P,(h) is the probability that he plays a head, if hc had previously played 
a tail. As in ease 1, he does not change his Ph(h) or P,(h) as the game 
progresses. 
An interesting machine, SEER, has been designcd to play the type of 
game outlined above (Hagelbarger, 1956). The stratcgy of this machine 
is based upon the principle that people do not make their selection of 
heads and tails completely randomly, but tend to have patterns in their 
selections. 
THE PLAYER 
Before we can outline optimum strategies, it is necessary to specify 
what the player's criterion of play is, and what details he knows about 
his opponent. The criterion for the player is that he makes his selections 
at any given time in a manner that allows him to maximize his expected 
net gain. Other criteria could be listed, e.g., he plays to maximize his 
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expccted net gain, but due to limited capital he has to keep the expccted 
variance of his winnings less than a given number, etc. This paper is 
limited to a discussion of strategies optimum with respect to a maximum 
expccted net gain criteria. 
In the introduction, it was statcd that the player knows the values 
of the elements of the game matrix. It is shown later that all he needs to 
know are the quantities Grt - GAt and Gx~ + Grt - Gut - Grh. He 
knows the distributions from which P(h) (in case 1) and Ph(h) and 
Pdh) (in case 2) Can be picked, but he does not know the values of 
P(h), Ph(h) or Pdh) selected. Furthermore, after each of his selections, 
he is informed of his opponent's selection. However, he must process this 
information about his opponent's selections in a manner that will require 
the minimum amount of changeable analogue memory storage lements, 
and yet will allow him to make optimum selections. A changeable 
analogue memory storage element is a storage device (such as a con- 
denser) that can store an analogue quantity that changes as a function 
of time. This minimization storage rcquirement arises from instrumenta- 
tion rcstrictions. 
THE P(h) ESTIMATION 
Before discussing optimum strategies, it is worthwhile to discuss how 
the player should estimate P(h) for the Bernoulli opponent. Suppose 
that the opponent selects a P(h) (the value of P(h) not being known) 
and after u trials, he has r heads and s tails, what is his probability of 
heads on the u + 1 trial? If we employ Baycs Theorcm we get 
P[r heads, stails I P(h)]P[P(h)] 
PIP(h) [rheads, stai ls]= S~ P[r heads, s tails]P(h)]P[P(h)] dP(h) (3) 
where PIP(h) I r heads, s tails] is the conditional probability density of 
having P(h) if we have r heads and s tails. 
Pit heads, s tails [ P(h)] is the conditional probability density of hav- 
ing r heads, and s tails, if we have a probability of heads of P(h) and 
P[P(h)] is the a priori probability density of having a P(h). 
If we assume independency of trials, i.e., the opponent is a first order 
probability opponent, we get that 
u! p(h)r P(t)" P[r heads, s tails I P(h)] = 
(4) 
(where P(t) = 1 - P(h)) 
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or  
P(h) ~ P(t)" P[P(h)] 
PIP(h) ] r heads, s tails] = f~ P(h)" P(t)" PIP(h)] dP(h) (5) 
If we assume P[P(h)] = 1 or that any P(h) is equally likely, then 
fo ~ r!s! P(h)~P(t)" dR(h) - (u + 1)! (6) 
or  
P[P(h) I r heads, s tails] - (u A- 1)l P(h)" P(t)" (7) 
r!s! 
E[P(h)] the expected value of P(h) the player expects on the u + 1 
toss is then 
fo I (u + 1)! p(h),+l r + 1 E[P(h)] = P(t)" dP(h) - (8) 
r!s! u + 2 
It is worthwhile to point out that the designer should never select an 
a priori density function of P(h), P[P(h)], which has a value zero over 
any finite region. If the actual probability should lie in this region, the 
estimation based on Bayes Theorem would not converge to the true 
value. On the other hand, if the designer selects an a priori probability 
density function that is never zero, 'regardless of how small the mini- 
mum value is, the estimation procedure for P(b) will eventually con- 
verge to the true value. 
F IRST  ORDER PROBABIL IST IC  STATIONARY OPPONENT 
The probability that the player eceives a utility of G~h after a selection 
is given by 
P(H) P(h) (9) 
where P(H) is the probability that the player chooses a head. The 
probability of the other three possible utilities can also easily bc derived. 
Thus, after each match the expected net gain, E(NG), the player re- 
ceives is expressed as 
E(NG) = P(H) P(h)Gnh + P(T) P(t)Gr, 
P(H) P(t)Gxt + P(T) P(h)Grh (10) 
[where P(T) = 1 - P(II)] 
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Equation 10 can be written as 
E(NG)  = ,~P(U) Jr fl (11) 
a = (Gu~ Jr Ors - O,, - O~h) P(h) Jr G,, - Gr, (12) 
fl = (Orb -- Grt) P(h)  Jr Gr, (13) 
Equation 11 indicates that the player should play heads with a prob- 
ability 1 if a is positive, and that he should play heads with a prob- 
ability zero if a is negative. If a is zero, the player can choose any 
probability P(H)  and still maximize his expected net gain. Therefore, 
after each selection the player must make estimates about the polarity 
of a and play heads or tails according to this estimate. 
Since the player knows the values of the elements of the matrix in Fig. 
1, he has only to determine the expected value of P(h) ,  E[P(h)] and 
compare this with the quantity ~/-y where 
8 = Gr~-  Gut (14) 
and 
-- GuN q- Or, -- Gut - Owh (15) 
Equation (2) states that we assume • > 0. Thus, if E[P(h)] :> ~/~/, 
a is estimated to be positive and the player always plays heads. Similarly 
if E[P(h)] < 8/.y, a is negative and the player selects tails. 
The rest of this section will be restrained to the case where the player 
assumes initially a fiat probability density function for P(h), i.e. 
PIP(h)] = 1; then we get the result of Eq. (8), that is 
E[P(h)] - r + I  (8) 
u- -b2  
At first thought, it appears that two changeable analogue storage 
elements are required to tabulate the opponent's selections; one stores a 
quantity r -b 1, the other u Jr 2. However, only one changeable storage 
element and a polarity detector are required. We are not interested in 
the actual value of E[P(h)], but only whether it is larger or smaller than 
8/'Z. The polarity detector is capable of sensing if the quantity in storage 
is positive or negative. 
Initially, the storage lement stores the quantity 
g(~, - 28) (16) 
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K can be any arbitrary positive constant. Each time the opponent plays 
heads, the quantity K(~, -- 6) is added to this storage clement; each time 
he plays tails, the quantity K6 is subtracted. 
After u tosses, where r of these are heads, the quantity D in storage is 
D = g[(r + 1)(~, -- ~) -- (s + 1)~] (17) 
If D > 0, then 
(r + 1)(~, - ~) > (s + 1)~ (18) 
adding (r - t -1)5 to both sides of the inequality and dividing by 
( r~-s+2)  and % we get 
r - l -1  > - (19) 
u+2 3, 
since r -b s = u, or 
Similarly if D < 0 
E[P(h)] > ~- (20) 
E[P(h)] < ~- (21) "/ 
Thus, before each selection, the player examines the contents of his D 
storage clement. If it is positive, he plays heads; if negative, he plays 
tails. 
As an example, suppose that the game matrix is the unity matrix where 
all the elements have a uni~ value. Then ~, -- 4 and ~ = 2, and K is 
selected to be 89 Thus, at the start, the quantity zero is in the storage 
element. If the opponent selects r heads and s tails, the quantity r - s 
is in the analogue storage element. Thus, if r is greater than s (more 
heads than tails), the player selects a head. If r is less than s, the player 
picks a tail. 
SECOND ORDER PROBABILISTIC STATIONARY OPPONENT ~IARKOV) 
The opponent has for this case selected a Ph(h) and a Pt(h) from a 
distribution of Ph(h)'s and Pt(h)'s. P^(h) is the probability that the 
opponent plays a head, if he had previously played a head; and Pt(h) 
is the probability that he plays a head, if he played a tail. 
An equation that is satisfied by Ph(h) and Pt(h) is 
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p(h) = p(h) Ph(h) + p(t) P,(h) (22) 
where p(h) is the marginal probability of playing heads and p(l) is the 
marginal probability of playing tails. If we solve (22) for p(h) we ob- 
tain 
Pt(h) (23) 
p(h) = 1 + Pt(h) -- Ph(h) 
If Pt(h) = p(h) then Ph(h) = Pt(h). This can be seen by substitution 
into Eq. (23). Similarly, if Ph(h) = P(h), then P~(h) = p(h). Unless 
some restriction is imposed, e.g., p(h) must be less than some value, 
Ph(h) can have any value from zero to one, and Pt(h) can have any 
value, independent of P~(h), from zero to one) 
The conditional expected net gains that the player can receive arc 
Eh(NG) = P~,(H)bP~,(h) -- ~] + [(Grh -- Gr,)P~(h) + Gr,] (24) 
E,(NG) = P,(H)[~P,(h) - ~l + [(G~ - GT,)P,(h) + GT,] (25) 
where 
E,(NG) 
Ph(H) 
P,(H) 
is the conditional expected net gain, if a head was previously 
played by the opponent. 
is the conditional expected net gain, if a tail was previously 
played by the opponent. 
is the conditional probability the player plays heads, if the 
opponent previously played heads. 
is the conditional probability the player plays heads, if the 
opponent previously played tails. 
l A model of the surface p(h) as a function of Ph(h) and Pt(h) is depicted in 
Fig. 4 of an article by White (1959a). This article also describes an electronic 
device that can generate random sequences ofheads and tails that arc controlled 
by the probabilities Ph(h) and Pt(h), 
The conditional expected net gain will then always be a maximum if 
Ph(H) or Pt(H) take one of the two extrcmum values of 0 or 1. And 
which of the two values selected epends upon whether Ph(h) is greater 
or less than ~/7, and whether Pt(h) is greater or less than ~/~. Table I 
illustrates the five possible cases or regions that can occur along with 
the optimum course of action, and the expected net gain that results. 
If we now assume that Ph(h) and P~(h) were selected from a flat dis- 
tribution of P^(h)'s and Pt(h)'s, we can outline the optimum strategy 
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TABLE I 
Opponent's Optimum course 
Re- conditional of action Average xpected 
giou probability net gain 
Pa(h) Pdh)  ~'A(U) P,(t/) 
~ 7P (h) -- ~ "t- Grip (h) 
I >~ >--  1 1 + Gr,p (/) 
T T 
$ ~ p(h)bPh(h) -- $] 
II >- -  <:~ 1 0 -{-Grhp(h) -~" Gr, p(t) 
$ p(t)['yPt(h) -- $] 
I I I  < - -  >-- 0 1 -P Grhp(h) 'k Gr,p(t) 
'Y '7 
IV <--  <--  0 0 Grip(h) ~ Gr, p(t) 
5" V 
[ $ Does Does GrAp(h) --k Gr,p(t) 
V =--  I =--  not not 
-~ ~ matter matter 
Restriction on 
,y 
- -_~1 
,y 
0<- -<1 
3" 
0_~--_~1 
v 
3, 
0_~- -~1 
v 
the player should select if he has two analogue storage lements, which 
we designate by Sh and St .  Initially, both Sh and St store the quantity 
K(-), - 2~i). If the opponent previously selected a head, then Sh is altered 
by the outcome of the opponent's next selection. If the opponent selects 
a head, the quantity K(~, - 5) is added to Sh ; if a tail, the quantity 
K~ is subtracted. The contents of the St element are altered in a similar 
fashion if the opponent's previous election was a tail. 
If the opponent had previously played a head, the player examines 
the contents of the Sh element. If it is positive, he selects a head; if 
negative, a tail. Similarly, the player examines the contents of St if the 
opponent  had previously played a tail. 
The opponent's first selection offers no information about Ph(h)  or 
Pt(h).  Therefore, it is disregarded and the process outlined above starts 
on the second move. 
Suppose a player makes his selections of heads and tails as if he were 
360 WmT~. 
playing a Bernoulli opponent, although the opponent was actually a 
Markov opponent. What is his expected loss? 
The answer depends upon which region of the Pt(h), P~(h) plane the 
opponent is in. In region I we note that 
Ph(h) > ~ and Pt(h) > ~ (26) 
7 7 
Therefore, by Eq. (22) we get 
p(h) = Ph(h)p(h) + Pt(h)p(t) > ~p(h) -[- ~- p(t) = ~- (27) ~, ,y .y 
If p(h) is greater than ~/-y, then from the earlier statements about strate- 
gies against a Bernoulli opponcnt, the player would always play heads. 
This is what he would do if he knew he were in region I of Table I. 
Therefore for Ph(h) and Pt(h) in region I the player does not lose by not 
knowing his opponent is second order. A similar type of analysis could 
be carried out for region IV where the player would always select ails, 
and region V where the player could do anything he wants. 
In region II and region III the player does better by knowing his ad- 
versary in a Markov type opponent. Figure 4 shows the regions de- 
scribed in Table I. In this figure ~/~, was arbitrarily chosen to be 0.75. 
Region II has been divided into two areas, IIa and IIb. IIa is the region 
where p(h) > ~/~,; IIb is where p(h) < ~/~,. If the player thought hat 
he were opposing a Bcrnoulli opponent in region IIa, he would always 
play heads while ideally he should play heads if his opponent previously 
played heads and tails if his opponent previously played tails. Thus, he 
suffers ome loss on his expected net gain. Table II lists the differences 
between the net gains the player would receive for the different regions 
shown in Fig. 4. 
This difference is largest at either point A (where almost always a 
head follows a tail and a tail follows a head) or at point B (where almost 
always a head follows a head or a tail follows a tail). 
If the unity matrix is employed, the knowledge that his opponent is 
Markov is worth a unity of utility at point A. At point B, the value of 
this knowledge is dependent on p(h). Equation (23) shows that for this 
one point p(h) is not uniquely determined by Ph(h) and Pt(h). 
NONSTATIONARY OPPONENT 
In another eport, we have also analyzed one case where the prob- 
ability P(h) of the opponent selecting heads changes tatistically with 
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Ph(h) q 
v 
0.5 ~ "1.0 
), 
Pt(h) 
FzG. 4. The P~(h), PKh) plane 
time (White, 1959b). We shall not give the details of this discussion in 
this article. However, in the particular situation postulatcd, the op- 
timum strategy requircs the player to store all of his opponent's indi- 
vidual selections in the past.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing paragraphs describe the strategies a player should 
employ in a simple penny matching game against an indifferent op- 
ponent. In order to allow an analytical discussion, it was necessary to 
make very simplifying assumptions, e.g., the player knows the elements 
of the game matrix, etc. For these simple problems it appears that the 
major elements of the machine should be concerned with making estima- 
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TABLE II 
Region p(h) Difference of net gains 
I >--  
lla >~ 
b 
l ib  <--  
I I la  >--  
l l l b  <-  
IV  <-- 
p(h)~[P,(h) -- 11 4- p(t)~ 
p(h)[vPA(h) - ~i] 
9 y[p(t)P,(h) -- p(h)] -t- p(h)~ 
p( t ) [ 'yP t (h )  - -  ~] 
tions of the opponent's probabilities. Once these estimations are per- 
formed, the decisions arc easily made in a deterministic manner. If the 
player has as an adversary, a Bernoulli opponent, he should determine if
E[P(h) ]  is greater or less than 5/~,. If he has a Markov opponent, he 
should determine if his estimation of Ph(h)  (when the opponent previ- 
ously played heads) or Pt (h )  (when the opponent previously playcd 
tails) is greater or less than ~/~'. The estimation of P(h)  for one type of 
simple nonstationary opponent is much more complicatcd. 
Investigations in this field of decision processes for the simple penny 
matching ame can go in many directions. More complicated indifferent 
opponents can be postulated, and analysis made as to how the player 
should estimate their probabilities. The optimum decision rules for a 
player having different criteria could also be investigated. 
A very worthwhile field of investigation would be where the opponent 
is considered to be interested. In this case, it is necessary to carefully 
consider what the criteria of the player and the opponent are, and what 
each knows about the other. Thus, this paper containing a discussion of 
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a player having a simple criterion playing a simple game against a simple 
opponent serves only as an introduction to a very complex field. 
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